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Policing organized crime 
A new d i rec t ion  
Freder ik  E. Jansen and Gerben J.N. Bru insma 1 
Until a few decades ago, the police were mainly a reactive bureaucratic 
organization that moved from one criminal event to the next, according to the 
degree to which the outside world required its services. Since then the police 
have abandoned the emphasis on law enforcement with regards to petty crime 
and public order. More recently the police have developed community policing 
as an important strategy in which preventive and pro-active operations are 
considered to be more useful and effective than exclusively enforcing criminal 
law after the offence has been committed (see Aronowitz, in this issue). 
However, in their approach to organized crime and various types of organiza- 
tional crime, the police continue to operate in the same way as they have done 
for years. Based on victims' reports or criminal intelligence, the police will 
conduct surveillance on a criminal group, establish a special police team 
within the department specialized in the crime concerned and will try to arrest 
the members (and preferably the l aders of the group), and ensure that 
enough evidence is available to result in a prosecution. This process requires 
thorough and time-consuming detective work. 
Until recently the police viewed organized crime as Mafia-like families with 
strict discipline and a hierarchical structure, in which one or two leaders carry 
out specialized tasks using violence, as if it were a company or a governmental 
organization. To a certain degree that Godfather Myth is still alive in the police 
force. In short, police (and public prosecutors) considered organized crime to 
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be a phenomenon that was isolated from society, to which they could only 
respond through enforcement of the criminal law. However, there is no 
empirical research supporting the effectiveness of this crime fighting ap- 
proach. Furthermore, over the years, some police forces have come to realize 
that this approach as proven to be unsuccessful. Indeed, a number of 
criminal groups have been disbanded and their members convicted every year, 
but the truth of the matter is that in most cases better organized groups have 
quickly replaced those which ave been disbanded, and the process of 
criminal investigation must start all over again. 
Some police forces in the Netherlands have sought new strategies to handle 
organized crime. They realize that innovations have mainly affected (informa- 
tion) technology and criminal investigation methods. External influences in 
this area of policing were rare. A possible explanation is that is was only the 
polic~-who really understood organized crime, and information on the subject 
was kept a closely guarded secret, to which others were not privy. Outsiders 
were automatically excluded from these police sources (Marx, 1984). It became 
almost impossible for criminologists to conduct independent scientific 
research, which led to a lack of systematic empirical knowledge of this signifi- 
cant social phenomenon. This resulted in a lack of understanding of organized 
crime, the types of criminal groups, their methods and the social context in 
which these groups operate and develop their illegal activities. Most research 
studies written by criminologists on the subject have been fragmented and 
incomplete. However, in order to develop new pro-active and preventive 
strategies the police need reliable access, authorative knowledge and an 
overall picture of organized crime, which will enable them to gain some 
insight in the societal context in which organized crime is embedded, the 
causes of its origins and growth. Until recently the police in our country have 
lacked this systematic insight. 
Organized crime in the Netherlands 
At the beginning of 1995 the Dutch Parliament initiated a Parliamentary 
Committee to inquire into undercover police methods. In order to assess the 
police methods used, the Committee was of the opinion that a scientific 
description of the organized crime situation in the Netherlands was necessary. 
The problem faced by the Parliamentary Committee was that the picture of the 
situation the police had presented over the previous years was biased and 
incomplete. This biased and incomplete picture was a consequence of the 
relative autonomy of the police forces and the fragmented, non-systematic and 
poorly structured way in which information was gathered. 
In order to get a reliable and valid view on the problem of organized crime, 
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the Parliamentary Committee invited four independent professors in criminol- 
ogy from four different universities, who came to be known as the Fijnaut 
group (Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, Bruinsma and Van de Bunt), to conduct a descrip- 
tive study on the nature and the extent of organized crime in the Netherlands 
(Fijnaut et al., 1996). The group of criminologists was lso asked to develop a 
definition of organized crime and a method to conduct empirical research in 
this area. 
In the criminological literature there was no example of research designs for 
such a large-scale mpirical study as they had to conduct. There were, of 
course, criminological studies in the field of organized crime, but these were 
small-scale research projects which were unsuitable for an empirical study for 
a whole country. 
For their study, the police forces submitted the empirical data in the form of 
all existing police files (more than 600 reports and all kinds of confidential 
information on persons, criminal groups and networks), as well as files from 
all other special police forces. The researchers also held interviews (approxi- 
mately 400) with members from local and ethnic minority communities, 
experts and others in various legal sectors, labour unions, and so on. All the 
information was evaluated in the light of criminological and sociological 
knowledge of society, because crime in general and organized crime cannot be 
described or understood outside the societal context. 
Organized crime has been an issue of debate among criminologists for years. 
In the Netherlands criminologists and practitioners have faced the same 
problem: that of achieving a single, 'workable' and operational definition of 
organized crime. Some define organized crime as a form of crime which is 
organized as a regular family-based business organization which closely 
resembles the Italian Mafia as depicted in the movie The Godfather. Others are 
of the opinion that every group activity in crime in which some form of co- 
operation is involved, is organized crime. Both views have been challenged by 
this empirical study. 
The Fijnaut group defined organized crime as 'a group or network of people 
which is primarily focused on illegally obtained profits, and in a systematic 
way commit serious crimes with great societal consequences. These groups or 
networks are capable of effectively covering up their crimes, in particular by 
using violence or means of corruption' (Fijnaut et al., 1996, pp. 24-25). From 
an analytical point of view they distinguished organized crime from profes- 
sional crime, corporate crime, terrorism and white-collar crime. Based on this 
definition organized crime currently comprises two essential kinds of criminal 
activities: on the one hand the supply of illicit goods and services and on the 
other hand the infiltration of legitimate business (construction ndustry, 
harbours, toxic waste industry, transportation, banking). The illegal markets in 
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the Netherlands are mainly concerned with the trading and selling of drugs: 
heroin; cocaine; marijuana nd hashish, XTC; and of other illegal goods and 
illegal services: ranging from arms smuggling, stolen cars, to illegal immigrants 
from all over the world (especially prostitutes). Further illegal activities include 
the production and trade in pornography, illegal gambling, loan sharking, 
money laundering; and international frauds, including EU-fraud. 
No systematic riminal infiltration of or racketeering in any particular sector in 
the Netherlands was found in the available data. Control by criminals of the 
ports, construction industry, trade unions, as in (parts of) the USA, lapan or 
Italy is not empirically demonstrated here. However, on a small scale, some 
segments of the Dutch socieW have been infiltrated by criminal groups. In 
certain areas in larger cities the catering and restaurant industry is slowly 
coming under their control, and a small number of trucking companies have 
been t~aken over by criminal groups to facilitate their drug smuggling activities. 
Furthermore, a small but significant number of dishonest lawyers has been 
corrupted by criminal groups. These lawyers are helping criminal groups to 
cover up crimes and to transfer 'criminal' money into the legal economy in the 
Netherlands or elsewhere in the world. 
There is no such thing as the organized crime in the Netherlands. The empiri- 
cal research indicates that there is a differential picture of organized crime in 
the Netherlands. The groups vary from loosely structured networks to tightly 
organized, solid families operating within the Dutch societal context. In 
addition to Dutch criminal networks, ethnic and international criminal groups 
are operating here: Surinam criminal groups, Turkish and Moroccan families, 
Russian criminal groups, Yugoslavian gangs, Chinese triads, Italian Mafia 
families, and Nigerian and Ghanese networks. By using or implicating their 
own personal friends and acquaintances, organized crime groups are involving 
several ethnic communities in our cities. In particular, the Turkish, Moroccan 
and Surinam communities in the Netherlands are partially dependant on the 
drugs economy. Geographically there is a great variation in groups and 
activities. The smuggling and distribution of drugs are the main illegal activi- 
ties of the majority of the criminal groups. There is a fine-meshed istribution 
structure all over the Netherlands for the supply of heroin, cocaine, hash, 
marijuana nd synthetic drugs. Even in very small villages, drugs can be 
bought from petty dealers or in so-called coffee shops. Most of the drug 
trafficking activities involve drugs in transit to other countries in Europe or to 
the United States. The Netherlands is functioning as a market-place, one of 
the many market places in the world. 
Within the allotted time frame, the four researchers not only endeavoured to 
obtain a picture of the situation on a national scale, but also conducted [our 
local studies that were to enhance national policy in this respect. One of these 
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studies, in the city of Enschede (the largest city in the Twente region; 147,000 
inhabitants), the picture of organized crime is also essentially determined by 
drug trafficking (Bruinsma nd Van de Bunt, 1996). The quantity and the 
quality of the organized crime groups, however, differ from those operating in 
the western part of the Netherlands (especially Amsterdam). Criminal groups 
(especially Turkish) focus on heroin and cocaine trafficking, but do not 
dominate the trade. The criminal market is relatively open, which means that 
newcomers are not excluded and that there is no struggle for hegemony in the 
drugs market. There are very few physical confrontations between groups. The 
criminal groups are relatively loosely structured and are organized around a 
few main figures who have built a personal network around themselves. If 
necessary, others are involved to do odd jobs. The personal networks are 
predominantly based on family and ethnic relations. As a consequence of the 
open structure of the drugs market, a relatively large part of the ethnic 
communities i somehow involved in hard drug trafficking. Migrants are also 
involved in the trafficking of women and local prostitution. 
Some policy implications 
The empirical research on organized crime in our country makes clear that 
organized crime is the result of a complex process (especially in the field of 
drug trafficking). Reuter's (1986, p. 174) statement that 'criminals do not 
inhabit a social and physical world that is different from the rest of society. 
They walk the same streets, dine in the same restaurants, and send their 
children to the same schools' was confirmed by the Fijnaut group. The 
findings have policy implications for the police and the government on a 
national and a local level. To mention a few: 
- there is no systematic nfiltration of or racketeering in legal sectors; 
- there is hardly any corruption of policemen, public prosecutors, judges, 
mayors, civil servants or representatives of industries and of labour unions (only 
in incidental cases were there some indications of corruption); 
- organized crime groups operate internationally (with the aid of new commu- 
nication technologies) in buying and selling illegal goods like drugs, but they 
have their bases in the local community where they are dwelling; 
- because of a lack of interest and because of the way police forces are organ- 
ized, local criminals have every opportunity to grow into organized crime 
groups; 
- once an organized crime group has settled in an area or neighbourhood, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible to get them out of it; 
- organized crime groups act as a role model for youngsters in a marginal 
economic and social position; 
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- organized crime groups make use of the social and economic (infra)structure 
of the city to deal in all kinds of drugs and to launder their criminal money by 
buying on a small scale real estate or bars, cafeterias and restaurants in the 
centre of the cities and by the exploitation of so-called 'coffee shops'; they also 
make use of shops, (import and export) firms, and all kinds of private companies 
to cover up their illegal activities; 
- the local market for hard drugs is small because of the relatively low number 
of drug addicts in the region; however the local market for soft drugs (marijuana, 
hashish) is larger because of the greater number of local users of all ages, but 
especially oungsters; 
- ethnic organized crime groups make use of the marginal position of the local 
ethnic communities by paying people to become involved in all kinds of minor 
illegal activities of these groups. 
The underlying assumptions of policing organized crime 
The newly acquired empirical knowledge of organized crime at the national 
and local level presented new opportunities to develop unique strategies for 
policing. The study showed that organized crime is a complex social phenom- 
enon that develops within a dynamic social context, manifests itself in differ- 
ent ways and that has embedded itself in society through symbiotic relations. 
Therefore, it cannot solely be combated by means of measures temming from 
criminal law. Criminal law is, as an ultimum remedium, the last link in a chain 
of possibilities, which can be used to fight organized crime. Fighting organized 
crime can only be effective if other instruments are brought into play, and this 
requires an understanding and knowledge of the development and operation 
of organized crime within a society, and also knowing possible ways to 
counteract i , or even knowing how to prevent criminal groups from carrying 
out their illegal activities. 
Until recently, the police were used to conducting surveillance on criminal 
organizations by setting up special teams. These teams were then instructed to 
ultimately produce an official report that provided sufficient criminal evidence 
to convince the judge that it was indeed a criminal organization. This repres- 
sion by head hunting is, of course, useful but hardly be classed as effective 
police work. Up till now 'there is no evidence that these successful prosecu- 
tions have in any way negatively impacted or altered the activities of organized 
entrepreneurial groups in illicit markets' (Potter, 1994, p. 182). 
Potter demonstrates that organized crime adapts a contigency strategy to its 
environment as a response to more repression. 'The reason that no impact on 
organized crime can be demonstrated as a result of the head hunting approach 
is that the model underlying that approach is wrong. Organized crime groups 
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learned long ago that to be successful in a threatening legal environment they 
must be prepared to adapt their structures and practices. The irony of the 
situation is that the more successful federal prosecutors become in incarcerat- 
ing organized crime leaders, the more the industry responds by decentralizing 
and maintaining temporary and ephemeral working relationships. Because the 
head hunting approach never disables more than a small proportion of the 
total number of organized crime entrepreneurs at a given time, it actually 
strengthens and rewards some organized crime groups by weeding out their 
inefficient competitors' (Potter, 1994, p. 180). 
However, a great number of the authors in the field of organized crime (e.g. 
Goldstock, 1991; Dombrink and Huey-Long Song, 1994) acclaims the intensifi- 
cation of the repressive approach: more and better co-operation between 
investigation agencies, a war against corruption, more infiltration, more wire- 
tapping, electronic surveillance, witness protection, more pro-active tech- 
niques in the investigations. 
However, all these strategies are based on the organized crime situation in 
(parts of) the United States or countries like Italy, Colombia or lapan. In the 
Netherlands, especially the eastern part of the Netherlands, the situation is as 
demonstrated before, less serious: there is hardly any infiltration in the legal 
sectors of society, there is very little evidence of corruption in the police and 
in local and national government and private organizations are not yet 
infected by organized crime. This ituation has provided the opportunity to 
develop new strategies in fighting organized crime, in which the police play an 
important role, but: 'it cannot do the whole job by itself. It is essential that 
other sectors, especially other agencies of government, become strongly 
involved in the hard work of social control. They cannot be allowed to turn a 
blind eye toward organized crime racketeering or to dismiss organized crime 
as 'a law enforcement problem" (Jacobs, 1991, p. 132). With this knowledge in 
mind, the question arises whether or not to implement the strategy of commu- 
nity policing in the field of organized crime. Community policing in the main 
city of Enschede was more or less effective in controlling traditional crimes 
like robberies, burglaries, violence and petty drug dealing (Kroes and 
Scholtens, 1996). 
Policing organized crime in Twente 
The uncertainty of the effectiveness of this approach was a sufficient reason 
for the Twente regional police force. This region is situated close to the 
German border in the eastern part of the Netherlands and occupies 1,437 km2. 
In the region live 587,987 inhabitants in three big cities (Enschede, Hengelo 
and Almelo) and the surrounding rural area. The police force has about 1,430 
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employees, policemen and policewomen, as well as civilians. The police force is 
organized in four districts with 21 local police-departments. In those local 
departments community policing is has been practised for some time. In a 
special organized crime branch of the police more than 140 detectives, 
analysts and civilians are active in developing a 'supplementary' working 
method. This new method is supplementary because the usual repressive 
procedure continues to be necessary. The supplementary strategy was to be of 
a preventive or pro-active nature. In order to fight organized crime, a pro- 
active approach necessitates co-operation with external partners. The police 
have knowledge and experience regarding organized crime, but potential 
partners (such as public authorities, the department of Public Prosecution, 
trade unions, local communities, legal sectors, industrial organizations or 
management of large companies) have the power to take the necessary 
preventive or obstructive measures. By ensuring that every partner co- 
operates, utilizing its own area of expertise, barriers can be built against 
organized crime. To that effect, these partners must be informed about the 
possible threats from criminal groups. 
A novelty in the approach of the Twente police is that it focuses on two 
mutually complementary strategies: traditional investigation, based on 
criminal law, of illegal activities of criminal groups in which modern methods 
are used; and developing measures, together with public and private partners, 
to hinder criminal groups in their efforts to expand their illegal activities and 
thus from presenting a threat to democratic and economic liberties in this 
(part of the) country. Implementing such measures implies that knowledge or
expertise of the partners be compiled and shared. The police, obviously, have 
the necessary know-how, but have been using it ineffectively and have 
prevented others from benefiting from it. 
The organization of the criminal investigation process 
The Twente police force has decided to take a more organized and structured 
approach to fighting organized crime, and has determined that police work 
shall not be led so much by unexpected events, when the seriousness of the 
offence and the required police effort cannot be predicted. A five-step model 
has been developed to that effect, in which particular partners and police 
officers play a specific role. This model consists of the following stages (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
=1 scanning regional environment 
1 
informative stage 
I 
tactical preliminary inquiries 
i 
tactical investigation 
assessment 
Scanning the regional environment 
The stage involving scanning the environment is intended to establish a 
complete picture of crime in the Twente region. It points out which factors in 
the region increase the potential for organized crime, such as the geographic 
location near the border or the demographic and economic situation and the 
infrastructure of private businesses and public authorities. This picture is used 
to inform the authorities and the relevant partners of the police and to identify 
potentially worrisome situations and to determine which businesses or 
organizations are being threatened by criminal groups. It also identifies what 
priorities in the integral approach are to be set and what factors the partici- 
pants in community policing can influence to prevent organized crime 
growing in their regional environment. This scan of organized crime is 
undertaken in co-operation with the International Police Institute Twente of 
the University of Twente (co-ordinated by the co-author of this article). To that 
effect, police sources, criminological knowledge and all kinds of other infor- 
mation from society are integrated. In due course, the police force itself will 
carry out the reconnaissance periodically in order to have an actual picture of 
the crime situation in the area. 
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lnformatiue stage 
Once the priorities are set by the authorities, the informative stage focuses on 
a number of selected neighbourhoods, businesses or organizations and the 
potential for and signs of organized crime in these neighbourhoods and 
businesses. This more specific picture is used to provide partners with infor- 
mation and advice concerning prevention. It also serves to determine which 
preliminary criminal inquiries are to be started against possible criminal 
organizations. In this stage the police and the public prosecutor will inform 
the relevant partners about the general factors conducive to organized crime. 
For the public office, for instance, it is relevant o know what activities and 
what parts of its organization are sensitive to corruption or infiltration by 
criminal groups. The catering and restaurant industry must be informed about 
protection rackets by criminal groups and the risks of being susceptible to 
financial offers by unknown financiers. 
Tactical preliminary inquiries 
In the tactical preliminary inquiry stage the detectives of the Organized Crime 
Division focus on the activities of a specific group of criminal offenders. The 
knowledge generated in this stage is used in the subsequent stage to establish 
the goals and tactics of the inquiry. It also serves to determine, more specifi- 
cally, which measures can be taken to prevent certain types of crime commit- 
ted by particular criminal groups. In this stage relevant information from the 
tactical investigation stage of the police is shared with specific organizations or 
companies. The sharing of sensitive criminal information with relevant 
partners is one of the fundamental problems in an integral approach, and it is 
for this reason that the legislator has not yet regulated this kind of information 
transfer. In more factual police advice there are, of course, many pitfalls. 
Which information can the police share with others? Only offences proven by 
the judge or also confidential criminal intelligence? The 'Act on police regis- 
ters' and the Netherlands' privacy legislation introduce many limitations in 
this respect. Information that is not related to individuals or companies is 
easter to transfer. 
Tactical inuestigation 
The stage of the tactical investigation (the project) focuses on the criminal 
investigation of a criminal organization, including seizing the capital acquired. 
This stage concentrates on the modus operandi of the criminal group and 
should lead to the arrest of suspects. Furthermore, it also provides a wealth of 
information regarding what measures can be taken in the future and serves to 
inform the partners as to how criminal groups operate and what options are 
available for counteracting their operations. 
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Due to the nature of their work, the police have considerable knowledge 
unrelated to criminal law, know- how that could be used more efficiently. This 
knowledge is acquired by gathering substantial information on the activities 
and people targeted in investigations. Imagine that a Chinese person were to 
be found dead. A team of detectives would start working on the case. Through 
interrogations and investigations into the victim's background, his lifestyle, 
working habits, communications, method of doing business and his personal 
relations within his own circle of Chinese acquaintances, the team will acquire 
a great deal of factual information. Much of this information is obtained from 
understanding Chinese customs and traditions (with all the regional differ- 
ences), the manner of formal and informal communication and the activities 
that take place within the closed Chinese community as well as those who 
become their victims, etc. If the criminal investigation is successful, the 
information will ultimately result in the case being solved, and possibly in the 
conviction of the suspect(s). Following disbandment of the team of detectives, 
the organization at large, but not the individual detectives, will lose the 
information that does not directly serve as criminal evidence. Abundant 
knowledge and opportunities are thus lost, resulting in the inability to solve a 
similar criminal case in the future. But more importantly, the knowledge could 
contribute towards future preventive measures. 
Assessment  
The assessment s age generates information on the development of the 
criminal procedure, the results and the role the various partners have played 
in the process. The assessment s age is indispensable if the approach is to be 
continually improved (Geerdink, 1997). Together with the public and private 
partners the police evaluate the contribution each have made during the 
previous period and what has to be improved in the future. 
The five-stage model described above also represents a process of sharing 
information. Both police and other organizations gather external and internal 
information. The extent of the role of the police will depend on the stage the 
process is in. This entire process of gathering, processing and supplying 
information is not only of strategic importance to the police, but just as, 
valuable for their partners. 
Preventive and pro-active work thus require a great deal of co-operation with 
external partners. The police act as consultants, explaining which measures 
the partners hould take. On the other hand, these partners will have accumu- 
lated information and experience through their own line of work which could 
benefit the Division Organized Crime. Four kinds of activities were developed 
in order to implement the new strategy: 
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- the police give advice to and co-operate with the partners, together develop- 
ing and implementing policy instruments in the region; 
- the entire police force is involved in improving the gathering of information 
resulting in less dependence on the small Criminal Intelligence department - 
community policing is therefore implemented quite consciously in fighting 
organized crime; 
- the organization has been equipped with an information desk that provides 
all police officers with relevant information 24 hours a day (even sensitive/ 
confidential information); 
- the criminal investigation i to organized crime will be less reactive, and more 
of an organized and structured management plan based on reliable and valid 
knowledge of the police's ocial environment: he regional picture of organized 
crime. 
Preliminary findings 
The implementation of the new policing strategy started in the middle of t996, 
a few months after the Fijnaut group reported its criminological research on 
the extent and nature of organized crime in the Netherlands. This short period 
precludes any far-reaching conclusions about the effectiveness of this method 
of policing organized crime in the Twente area. However, some preliminary 
findings can be reported. 
Since the middle of 1996, some Division staff members have been given the 
task of keeping in touch with and advising external partners. These officials 
are expected to influence the environment through mobilizing partners with 
regard to reducing the opportunities for organized crime activities. They 
inform public authorities on corruption and together with public authorities, 
they analyze areas where public officials are prone to corruption (e.g. granting 
licences). Other police officers of the Division have, together with industrial 
organizations, been describing and analysing areas in specific sectors, such as 
the hotel and restaurant industry or the construction industry, that could be 
sensitive to infiltration. For example, how susceptible is the regional hotel and 
restaurant industry or the real estate industry to acting as a cover-up for 
criminal groups that are dealing in drugs? The same policemen provide 
information, based on experience, on signs of illegal activities in a specific line 
of business. For instance, they inform partners on how to recognize a suspi- 
cious offer concerning investment in real estate. Furthermore, a so-called 
regional platform was set up in which several partners work together in 
studying and discussing integral policy instruments, addressing problems 
surrounding organized crime groups. 
In addition to the business-related contacts which facilitate a better under- 
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standing of potential low thresholds for the development of crime, it is 
extremely important hat use be made of the organization's potential sources 
of information. One of the outcomes of the criminological study of the Fijnaut 
group is that while members of criminal groups do indeed operate interna- 
tionally, they continue to live in their own neighbourhood, near their relatives 
and friends. They also develop criminal activities in the environment in which 
they live. Police officers work in these neighbourhoods every day and besides 
criminal offences, also notice other things that could be relevant o broaden- 
ing our understanding of organized crime. The fact that, despite few custom- 
ers, small businesses grow very. quickly, or that visitors keep coming and going 
from certain buildings, must attract attention. Moreover, police officers will 
obtain information from the people who live in those neighbourhoods and 
from the public at large regarding the dealings in these businesses (hotel and 
restaurant business, tailor shops, building companies). The police constables 
are therefore taught to look at their work not only from a reactive, criminal law 
related point of view, but to start taking a pro-active approach. 
A satisfactory organization of police information is an important prerequisite 
for actually converting know-how into results to enhance safety and the 
quality of life in society, and to address and reduce the most serious of crimes 
in a broad sense. That is why the Twente police force has established an 
information desk that assists all police officers in Twente (approximately 2400 
'eyes and ears') 24 hours a day. All operational information, even sensitive 
'criminal intelligence' is available. The 'desk research' carried out 24 hours a 
day, enables the police to establish links with information required or gathered 
in the neighbourhoods. The staff of the information desk has all the informa- 
tion at hand, as well as information on organized crime. In this manner, we 
endeavour to benefit more from knowledge and information present in basic 
police work. 
Conclusions 
Recent criminological research in the Netherlands underscores the fact that 
organized crime is embedded in society and the overall picture makes it clear 
that police emphasis on a crime fighting model of the police, based solety on 
criminal law will not be entirely effective. Therefore, the Twente police force 
developed a new strategy of policing organized crime in their region. This 
strategy is based on criminological knowledge and on the approach of com- 
munity policing: preventive, pro-active and integrated actions taken by various 
partners of the police in order to reduce illegal activities of organized crime 
groups. This strategy, however, can only succeed when two conditions are 
satisfied. First, this approach can only function in an open democratic society 
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in which numerous public and private organizations and the public feel 
responsible for the emergence of organized crime in their environment. 
Secondly, the police force and their partners must be (relatively) free of 
corruption. This implies that this strategy can only be effective in societies in 
which organized crime has not deeply penetrated democratic institutions and 
business organizations. 
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